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Yi Li and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
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Abstract. Path planning is a fundamental and extensively explored problem in
robotic control. We present a novel economic perspective on path planning. Specif-
ically, we investigate strategic interactions among path planning agents using a
game theoretic path planning framework. Our focus is on economic tension be-
tween two important objectives: efficiency in the agents’ achieving their goals,
and safety in navigating towards these. We begin by developing a novel mathe-
matical formulation for path planning that trades off these objectives, when be-
havior of other agents is fixed. We then use this formulation for approximating
Nash equilibria in path planning games, as well as to develop a multi-agent co-
operative path planning formulation. Through several case studies, we show that
in a path planning game, safety is often significantly compromised compared to
a cooperative solution.
Keywords: Multi-agent system · Path planning
1 Introduction
Path planning is a fundamental technical problem in autonomous robotic control. Decades
of development have led to significant theoretical and algorithmic progress, with au-
tonomous vehicles (including autonomous cars and UAVs) increasingly finding their
way to urban roads and skies.
In much of the research on path planning, including mobile robot navigation [10, 1,
11], a fundamental task is to find a collision-free motion from a starting position to the
goal position given a collection of known obstacles. Variations on this theme, such as
dealing with stochastic and moving obstacles, have received recent attention with the
emergence of numerous novel unmanned robotic systems and aerial vehicles [16, 2, 9].
As interactions among autonomous vehicles, be it on our roads or in the skies, be-
comes more routine, we can expect a certain amount of conflict to emerge, as the au-
tonomous agents, designed in service of their individual goals, must occasionally find
these goals dependent on other autonomous agents nearby. However, remarkably lit-
tle research has been devoted to the question of what autonomous vehicle ecosystem
would thereby emerge, when many autonomous agents attempt to achieve their individ-
ual goals, but must necessarily interact with one another in doing so.
To investigate the consequences of such strategic interactions among multiple path
planners, we propose a study of path planning games. An important feature of such
games is that a collection of self-interested path planners each trade off two objectives:
efficiency, or speed with which their goals are achieved, and safety, or probability that
they crash before reaching their goals. Moreover, they trade these off in individual,
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potentially diverse, ways. Consequently, in order to study path planning games we must
take an economic, rather than a purely algorithmic, perspective on path planning.
To this end, we first develop a novel mathematical programming method for com-
puting a single-agent path plan, accounting for these two objectives, given fixed dy-
namic behavior (i.e., path plans) of all other agents, as well stochastic disturbances
in the environment. Next, we propose a simple iterative algorithm, best response dy-
namics, for approximately computing Nash equilibria of path planning games, given
the best response mathematical programs. Finally, we develop a novel mathematical
program for computing a cooperative multi-agent path plan which optimally trades off
efficiency and safety among all agents—that is, again, taking the economic perspective
on the multi-agent path planning problem.
We numerically investigate path planning games through several case studies in-
volving two and three agents. Our central observation is that as safety becomes more
important to agents, a large gap opens up between safety achieved by a socially optimal
and Nash equilibrium outcomes; in other words, Nash equilibria exhibit significantly
more collisions than desirable by all agents. The main reason for this is that while each
agent is concerned with safety, they only account in their objective for the impact of
collisions on themselves, and not on other agents who crash along with them.
Our observation about safety consequences of path planning games raises a con-
cern as we look towards the future of autonomous vehicles interacting in populated
environments, particularly as they tend to be designed primarily in service of their in-
dividual ends, rather than those of the entire autonomous and non-autonomous vehicle
ecosystem.
2 Related Work
One common paradigm for studying multi-agent path planning problems is by consid-
ering cooperative path planning involving multiple agents. For example, Shen et al. [22]
studied cooperative path planning in UAV control system, while LaValle [15] presented
an algorithm for applying path planning with stochastic optimal control.
Game theoretic problems related to path planning have been considered from sev-
eral perspectives. Closest to traditional path planning are zero-sum models of games
against nature in which agents are designed to be robust against adversarial uncertainty
in the environment [8, 7]. Classic approaches consider rules of interaction and nego-
tiation among self-interested agents, including planning agents [19, 13, 14]. Loosely
related also is the extensive literature on multi-agent learning, in which multiple agents
repeatedly interact in strategic scenarios in which rewards and dynamics depend on all
agents (often modeled as stochastic games) [23].
Another important class of game theoretic models related to path planning are rout-
ing games. The routing games, as a framework for modeling routing traffic in a large
communication network, were first informally discussed by Pigou [18]. This model was
first formally defined by Wardrop [24] based on a flow network under the non-atomicity
assumption. Therefore, equilibrium flows in non-atomic selfish routing games are often
called Wardrop equilibria. Since then, a number of fundamental results for the non-
atomic routing games have been proved by various researchers, such as the existence
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and uniqueness of equilibrium flows [3], first-order conditions for convex program-
ming problem [4], and the theory of general non-cooperative non-atomic games [21].
The seminal work by Roughgarden and Tardos [20] first characterized the gap between
centralized and decentralized control in multi-agent routing problems, formalized as
the price of anarchy, or ratio of socially optimal to worst-case equilibrium outcomes.
Their work explained the principles behind a broad class of counter-intuitive phenom-
ena, such as Braess’s Paradox [6].
Both routing games and path planning games investigate the competition among
agents during their navigation tasks (e.g. passing through bottlenecks). However, in
routing games, the state space is a graph-based structure, and the cost of competition
is modeled by a set of latency functions without considering the agents’ dynamics,
while path planning games consider the problem at higher fidelity, with a continuous
state space where the latency is caused by the interaction among agents. Moreover, our
model of path planning games allows us to explicitly study the tradeoff agents make
between performance and safety, an issue not considered in routing games.
3 Model
We describe the problem by first introducing the model of agents’ motions, and then
formulating the path planning game.
Consider a state space X = Rn. We represent an agent i by a polyhedron described
by a collection of Mi hyperplanes: Pi = {aTijx ≤ bij , j ∈ {0, ...,Mi}}. Each agent
polyhedron Pi contains a point ri ∈ X called the reference which rigidly attaches to
the polyhedron such that the state of an agent can be determined by the position of its
reference. We assume that agents move in discrete time, and a control input uit ∈ Uit ⊂
Rm applied to the ith agent at time t moves the agent from state ri,t ∈ X at time t to
state ri,t+1 ∈ X at time t+ 1 according to a linear stochastic dynamic model
ri,t+1 = Airit +Biuit + ωi, (1)
where Ai ∈ Rn×n, Bi ∈ Rn×m, and ωi ∼ N (0, Σi) is the process noise for ith agent
at time t following an n-dimension zero-mean Gaussian distribution with a covariance
matrix Σi.
For each agent we are given its initial placement r0 ∈ X (i.e., where the agent starts)
and a goal rgoal ∈ X which the agent needs to reach. Let ri,0:T =< ri0, ..., riT > be a
state sequence of the (reference point of the) ith agent from time 0 to T and ui,0:T =<
ui0, ..., uiT > be a corresponding control sequence. However, once the agent reaches
its goal, it remains there deterministically, and has no effect on other agents. We aim to
find the optimal control sequence for the ith agent in this stochastic motion model, with
the following criteria in mind:
1. After applying the resulting control sequence, the expected terminal position of the
ith agent is ri,goal,
2. the upper bound of the probability that the ith agent collides with other agents
should be minimized, and
3. the agent reaches the goal in as few time steps as possible.
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For the moment, we allow no feedback from observed state to control; we relax this
restriction below.
Path Planning Game: Given these models of individual agents, we define a path plan-
ning game by a collection of N agents, with each agent i’s action space comprised
of all possible control sequences,
T∏
t=0
Uit. In this game, each agent aims to compute
an optimal control sequence, given the behavior of others, trading off two objectives:
efficiency, or the number of times steps it takes to reach the goal, and safety, or the
probability of collision. To formalize, let Ti be the expected number of times steps to
reach the goal (if no collision occurs), and Gi the safety margin, related to the upper
bound on the probability of collision as discussed below. An agent i’s objective is then
Ji(ui,0:Tmax , u−i,0:Tmax) = λTi + (1− λ)Gi, (2)
What makes this a game is that the safety Gi of an agent i depends on the paths taken
by all agents, rather than i alone. For example, if two agents are moving towards one
another, and directly towards their respective goals, the only way for one of them to
avoid collision is to circumnavigate the other, taking a longer path towards the goal.
Next, we describe how to define and compute Ti and Gi, and compute a best response
for a given agent i, fixing behavior of all others.
4 Computing an Agent’s Best Response
An important subproblem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a path planning game is
to compute a best response of an arbitrary agent i when we fix the control policies of all
others. We show that calculating agents’ best responses in path planning games amounts
to a single-agent path planning problem with motion uncertainty. Blackmore et al. [5]
previously developed a probabilistic approach for computing a robust optimal path for
a robot in the environment with a static obstacle and motion uncertainty via mathemat-
ical programming. However, in our context, where an agent trades off efficiency and
safety, with stochastic moving obstacles (representing other agents), this prior approach
is inadequate. In this section we develop a novel method for solving such problems.
4.1 Best Response for a Point-Like Agent
First, consider a simple path planning problem illustrated in Figure 1. In this problem,
there is a set of static obstacles and an agent, represented by a point, aiming to find a
collision-free minimum-time path from its initial placement to its goal position under
motion uncertainty. Assume each obstacle has a given collision volume which can be
represented by a polyhedron. To create a mathematical program for solving this prob-
lem, two factors need to be taken into account: goal position constraints and collision
avoidance constraints.
Formally, let rt denote the position of an agent at time t with its initial placement r0
and the goal position rgoal. Suppose that the motion dynamics of the agent follows (1)
(from which, we remove the index i, since there is only one agent). Assume there areK
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Single agent path planning with a point-like agent.
obstacles represented by polyhedra Pn, n = 1, ...,K, with Pn = {x|aTnpx ≤ bnp, p =
1, . . . , En}, where En is the number of hyperplanes representing the polyhedron Pn.
As before, let T denote the planning horizon (so that the goal must be reached by time
T ; we assume the horizon is long enough that the goal can be successfully reached even
with the obstacles).
Efficiency and Reachability: Let {d0, ..., dT } denote a collection of binary indicators
which indicate whether the agent has reached its goal, i.e., dt = 1 iff rt = rgoal. Then,
with a large positive number M , the constraints
∀t,||rt − rgoal|| ≤M(1− dt) (3)
T∑
t=0
dt = 1 (4)
make sure that the agent will reach to its goal position sooner or later (and we assume
that there exists a feasible solution). Moreover, the number of time steps to reach its
goal position can be represented by
T =
T∑
t=0
t · dt (5)
which is one of our objectives (corresponding to Ti, for an agent i above). Since rt
is a random variable, this constrain is stochastic. We approximate it by a determinis-
tic constraint, replacing the position of the agent rt with its expected position rt in
Constraint (3).
Collision Avoidance: Let A denote the event that the agent has a collision, and let
A(n, t), n ∈ {1, ...,K} denote the event that the agent collides with the nth obstacle at
time step t. We wish to minimize the probability of a collision, Pr(A), or minimize G
such that
Pr(A) ≤ G. (6)
The agent has a collision if the agent collides with any of obstacles at any time steps,
which is the event
A =
T∨
t=0
K∨
n=1
A(n, t) (7)
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Then, by the union bound
Pr(A) = Pr
(
T∨
t=0
K∨
n=1
A(n, t)
)
≤
T∑
t=0
K∑
n=1
Pr(A(n, t)) ≤ G (8)
⇐ [∀n, t, Pr(A(n, t)) ≤ g(n, t)] ∧ [
T∑
t=0
K∑
n=1
g(n, t) = G], (9)
where g(·) is risk allocation which indicates how the risks are distributed among obsta-
cles and time steps. Next, we consider the event that the agent collides with an obstacle
at time step t, which means that the position of the agent is inside the corresponding
polyhedron. Thus, collision with the nth obstacle can be described by
A(n, t) :
En∧
p=1
aTnp · rt ≤ bnp (10)
Since the condition (10) including rt is also stochastic, to convert it into a deterministic
one, we consider its probabilistic measure, Pr{A(n, t)}. Following (6), our constraints
then become
Pr
{
En∧
p=1
aTnp · rt ≤ bnp
}
≤ g(n, t). (11)
Since a polyhedron is convex, a sufficient condition is,
En∨
p=1
Pr(aTnp · rt ≤ bnp) ≤ g(n, t). (12)
Based on the approach by Blackmore et al. [5], expression (11) can be further simplified
using the linear approximation of the upper bound on the probability of collision. First,
consider rt, the position of agent at time step t given its initial placement r0 and the
control sequence u0:t, which is a random variable following a Gaussian distribution,
rt ∼ N(rt, Σt), where
rt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1Buk +Atr0 (13)
and
Σt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1Σ(AT )t−k−1. (14)
For a single Gaussian random variableX ∼ N(µ, σ2), we can take the inverse Gaussian
distribution function at both sides of Pr(X < 0) ≤ δ and get u ≥ √2σerf−1(1− 2δ).
Similarly, from rt ∼ N(rt, Σt), we can get (aTnprt−bnp) ∼ N(aTnprt−bnp, aTnpΣtanp).
Then, we take the inverse Gaussian distribution function at both sides of (12), and
En∨
p=1
aTnprt − bnp ≥ e(n, t) (15)
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where e(n, t) =
√
2aTnpΣtanp · erf −1(1− 2g(n, t)) and erf (z) = 2√pi
∫ z
0
e−t
2
dt. We
call this the safety margin, because it expands the margin of obstacles and shrinks the
feasible planning domain in order to consider motion uncertainty. Because the motion
of the agent after it reaches its goal has no further effect, we add the term M
t∑
k=0
dk to
these constraints where M is a large positive number.
Define s(n, t) = erf −1(1 − 2g(n, t)). Since erf −1 is strictly monotonically in-
creasing, we can minimize
T∑
t=0
K∑
n=1
g(n, t) by minimizing
G = −
T∑
t=0
K∑
n=1
s(n, t). (16)
This is the safety portion of an agent’s objective (Gi for an agent i above).
A Path Planning Mathematical Program: Our goal is to minimize J = λT + (1 −
α)G, balancing efficiency and safety using an exogenously specified parameter λ. Com-
bining this objective with the goal and collision avoidance constraints described above,
we obtain the following mathematical program for single-agent path planning:
MP1:
min
u,s,d
λT (d) + (1− λ)G(s) (17)
s.t.
∀t, ut ∈ Ut (18)
∀t, rt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1Buk +Atr0 (19)
∀t, ||rt − rgoal||1 ≤M · (1− dt) (20)
∀t, dt ∈ {0, 1} (21)
T∑
t=0
dt = 1 (22)
∀t∀n,
En∨
p=1
aTn,prt > bnp + e(n, t)−M
t∑
k=0
dk (23)
∀t, e(n, t) = s(n, t)
√
aTnpΣtanp (24)
∀t, Σt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1Σ(AT )t−k−1 (25)
∀t∀n, 0 ≤ s(n, t) ≤M ′ (26)
One residual concern is that if an agent cannot possibly collide with an nth obstacle at
time step t (i.e., if g(n, t) = 0), s(n, t) can become unbounded. To address this, we add
Constraint (26) which imposes an upper bound M ′ on s(·), where M ′ is an appropriate
positive number so that erf (M ′) ' 1.
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Since MP1 is a disjunctive linear program which can be solved by an off-the-shelf
linear programming solver. A solution < u, s(·), d > found by MP1 with dT0 = 1
means that the agent can reach to its goal position in T0 time steps with the probability
of collision at most
T0∑
t=0
K∑
n=1
1−erf(s(n,t))
2 by applying the control sequence u0:T0 .
4.2 Generalization: Feedback Control
Above we considered open loop path planning where the control sequence is determin-
istic and fixed a priori. We now extend our approach to closed loop (feedback) control,
following the ideas in Geibel and Wysotzki [12] and Oldewurtel et al. [17].
Assume we have a nominal control sequence u0:T . Then, the feedback control se-
quence can be obtained by integrating the nominal control sequence and the feedback
gain:
ut = ut +K(xt − xt), (27)
where xt is the observed and xt the predicted position, and K is an exogenous pa-
rameter which determines the importance of the error feedback term (xt − xt). In this
approach, ut is computed using the MP1 offline, and the actual control sequence is then
generated at runtime by applying (27). As a consequence, the Constraints (25) above
become
Σt =
t−1∑
k=0
(A+BK)t−k−1Σ[(A+BK)T ]t−k−1. (28)
Notice that when there is no error feedback (K = 0) this becomes equivalent to open
loop control.
4.3 Collision Avoidance for Polyhedral Agents
Having considered the problem for point-like agents, and then generalizing the ap-
proach to consider error feedback, we now generalize the collision avoidance con-
straints to polyhedral agents.
Consider states of the agent and the nth obstacle, both represented by polyhedra
Pt and Pn, respectively. The position of the agents’ reference is rt. Since the reference
point rigidly attaches to the agent, let C = {x−rt|x ∈ Pt} denote the relative region of
the agent to its time-dependent reference. When the agent collides with the nth obstacle
at time t, we know that ∃x ∈ Pt ∩ Pn (i.e., the intersection of these time-dependent
polyhedra is non-empty). Thus, from the point view of the agent, the set of positions of
its reference causing collision with the nth obstacle can be represented by Kn = {x−
c|x ∈ Pn, c ∈ C} = −C ⊕ Pn, where ⊕ is the Minkowski addition. Since both C and
Pn are polyhedra, Kn is a polyhedron and can be represented by a set of hyperplanes:
Kn = {x|aTnpx ≤ bnp, p = 0, ..., En}, where En the number of hyperplanes of Kn.
The agent collides with the nth obstacle at time step t if the position of its reference is
in Kn, that is, when
rt ∈ Kn ⇔
En∧
p=1
aTnprt ≤ bnp. (29)
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Comparing (29) with (10), we can see that the problem with polyhedral agents can also
be solved via the mathematical program above, if we treat the agent as its reference
point, and assign the collision volume Kn to each obstacle.
4.4 Best Response Solver
Our final challenge is to consider the actual best response problem of an arbitrary agent
in the path planning game, where all other agents are moving (rather than static) ob-
stacles with known stochastic motion policies. We now address this problem, obtaining
the final mathematical program for computing a single-agent best response.
Let i denote the agent for whom we are computing a best response, with −i =
{1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., N} the set of all others. Let i be represented by a polyhedron
Pit with reference rit and let j ∈ −i be represented by Pjt with reference rjt. Let Ci
denotes the relative region of i to its reference, while Cj denotes the relative region of
j ∈ −i to its reference. Suppose that j reaches its goal position by time step Tj with
the corresponding known control sequences uj,0:Tj . Then, for each j and t, Kijt =
−Ci ⊕ Pjt is a polyhedron with Kijt = {x|aTijpx ≤ bijtp, p ∈ {0, ..., Eij}} where Eij
is the number of hyperplanes related to the shapes of Ci and Cj .
Now we formalize how the control sequence uj,0:Tj of each agent j affects Pjt so
that we can determine Kijt. From motion dynamics of i and j,
rit =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1i Biuik +A
t
iri0 + ωit (30)
∀j, rjt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1j Bjujk +A
t
jrj0 + ωjt (31)
From the perspective of agent i, the motion of agent j can be treated as deterministic if
we “migrate” motion uncertainty from j to i so that
∀j, r′ijt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1i Biuik +A
t
iri0 + ωit − ωjt
∀j, r′jt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1j Bjujk +A
t
jrj0. (32)
For each j, let ω′ijt = (ωit − ωjt) ∼ N(0, Σit + Σjt) denote the relative motion
uncertainty of i to j at time t. Let
∀j,∆r′jt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1j Bjujk +A
t
jrj0 − rj0 (33)
denote the position shift of agent j at time step t determined by its control sequence
uj,0:Tj . Then, we obtain the position of Kijt by shifting Kij0 by ∆rjt. Since Kijt =
{x|aTijpx ≤ bijtp}, we obtain
bijtp = bij0p + a
T
ijp ·∆r′jt. (34)
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Consequently, we obtain the following mathematical program for i’s best response:
MP2:
min
u,si(·),d
Ji = λTi + (1− λ)Gi (35)
s.t.
∀t, uit ∈ Uit (36)
∀t, rit =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1i Biuik +A
t
iri0 (37)
∀t, ||rit − ri,goal||1 ≤M · (1− dit) (38)
∀t, dit ∈ {0, 1} (39)
T∑
t=0
dit = 1 (40)
∀j∀t = 0, ..., Tj ,
Eij∨
p=1
aTi,j,prit > bij0p + aijp ·∆r′jt + eijt
−M
t∑
k=0
dik (41)
∀i∀t, Σit =
t−1∑
k=0
(Ai +KiBi)
t−k−1Σi[(Ai +KiBi)T ]t−k−1 (42)
∀t∀j,∆r′jt =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1j Bjujk +A
t
jrj0 − rj0 (43)
∀j, eijt =
√
aTijp(Σit +Σjt)aijp · si(j, t) (44)
∀t∀n, 0 ≤ si(n, t) ≤M ′ (45)
Notice that the constraints (41) are effective only for t = 0, ..., Ti, and i is not affected
by any j who reached its goal.
5 Finding Equilibria in Path Planning Games
Armed with the best response solvers for each agent i in a path planning game, our goal
is to approximate a Nash equilibrium in the resulting game. We do so by applying best
response dynamics which, if it converges (which it does in our experiments), yields a
Nash equilibrium.
Best response dynamics is an asynchronous iterative algorithm in which a single
agent i is chosen in each iteration, and we maximize i’s utility (i.e., compute its best
response) fixing control strategies for all other agents. Best response of an agent i can
be calculated as discussed above.
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6 Optimal Multi-Agent Path Planning
We now extend the single-agent best response problem to compute an optimal multi-
agent path plan. In this case, the control sequences ui,0:Ti of all agents are unknown
a priori (as they are being computed jointly). Compared to calculating an agents’ best
response, we replace the objective of the current agent with the sum of all agents’ ob-
jectives, i.e., the new objective is J =
∑
i Ji, where Ji is the objective of agent i.
Moreover, we add constraints analogous to MP2 to make sure that the collision avoid-
ance conditions hold from the perspective of every agent simultaneously. We thus obtain
the following mathematical program:
MP3:
min
u,s,d
J =
N∑
i=1
Ji (46)
s.t.
∀i, t, uit ∈ Uit (47)
∀i, t, rit =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1i Biuik +A
t
iri0 (48)
∀i, t, ||rit − ri,goal||1 ≤M · (1− dit) (49)
∀i, t, dit ∈ {0, 1} (50)
∀i
Tmax∑
t=0
dit = 1 (51)
∀i, t,−i,
Ei,−i∨
p=1
aTi,−i,prit > bi,−i,0,p + ai,−i,p ·∆r′−i,t
+ ei,−i,t −M
t∑
k=0
(dik + d−i,k) (52)
∀i∀t, Σit =
t−1∑
k=0
(Ai +KiBi)
t−k−1Σi[(Ai +KiBi)T ]t−k−1 (53)
∀i, t,∆r′it =
t−1∑
k=0
At−k−1i Biui,k +A
t
iri0 − ri0 (54)
∀i, t∀ − i, ei,−i,t =
√
aTi,−i,p(Σit +Σ−i,t)ai,−i,p · si(t, j)
∀i∀t∀n, 0 ≤ si(n, t) ≤M ′ (55)
The term −M
t∑
k=0
(dik + d−i,k) in Constraints (52) means that an agent will not be
affected by other agents who have reached their goal position by time step t, and, con-
versely, it will not affect the final solution once it reaches its goal position.
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7 Experiments
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2: Experiment scenarios.
Armed with the techniques for computing both Nash equilibria in path planning
games, as well as a socially optimal solution of the corresponding “cooperative” multi-
agent planning scenario, we now consider several case studies to understand the impact
of self-interested behavior. Specifically, we consider the following 2D scenarios:
– 2 agents with opposing goal positions (Figure 2(a)): the goal position of each
agent is behind the initial placement of the other. In this scenario, the first agent
moves from starting coordinate position (10, 50) to goal at position (95, 50), and
the second agent moves from (90, 50) to (5, 10).
– 2 agents moving in parallel (Figure 2(b)): the initial and goal positions of both
agents are near one another. In this scenario, the first agent moves from (10, 70) to
(95, 70) and the second agent moves from (10, 35) to (95, 35).
– Intersection with 2 agents (Figure 2(c)): one agent moves from the bottom to the
top of the 2D grid, and the other moves from left to right. In this scenario the first
agent moves from (10, 50) to (90, 50) and the second agent moves from (50, 10) to
(50, 90).
– Intersection with 3 agents (Figure 2(d)): one agent starts at the top of a 2D grid
and moves down, while the other two start at southeast and southwest, and move
northwest and southeast, respectively. In this scenario the first agent moves from
(50, 90) to (50, 5), the second agent moves from (85, 30) to (11, 73), and the third
agent moves from (14, 29) to (90, 73).
In each experiment, each agent is represented by a square with each side of length 15
and parallel to either the x or the y axis. The control inputs are 2D velocity vectors and
the maximum velocity of agents in both x and y direction is 10 (thus, A = B = I in
agents’ motion dynamic). Agents’ motion is distorted by a Gaussian distribution with
the covariance matrix 1.9I . For each scenario we consider solutions with and without
feedback control, where the feedback gain for the latter was chosen to be K = 0.5.
Throughout, we assume that all players are equally concerned about safety vs. effi-
ciency; formally, all players share the same parameter λ.
The results are shown in Figures 3-10. In each figure, the horizontal axis is the λ
value which represents the importance of safety for both agents, where lower values of
λ imply that safety is more important. The left plots show the objective value, where
lower is better. The middle plots give the time to goal, where lower is, again, better.
The right plots show safety margin, where again lower is better. We present average
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quantities over all agents; the qualitative observations are similar if we consider these
at individual agent level.
The first observation is that the difference between socially optimal and equilibrium
objective values appears small ((a) plots in Figures 3-10). It is therefore tempting to
conclude that equilibrium behavior is similar to socially optimal, but it turns out that
this is not the case: in particular, it turns out that the trade-off between efficiency and
safety made by the agents in equilibrium is very different from optimal.
Considering next the (b) and (c) columns of the figures, we can observe that sys-
tematically performance improves, while safety is often significantly compromised, in
equilibrium as compared to a social optimum. The difference is particularly dramatic in
the first two scenarios, when the agents are in direct conflict in their quest to reach their
respective goals. The gap between optimal and equilibrium safety in the other scenarios
tends to be larger for relatively high values of λ.
Another general observation we can make is that often the solutions with a feedback
controller are closer to optimal, particularly from the perspective of safety. The excep-
tions involve the intersection scenarios, where the gap is larger for higher values of λ
in the feedback controller solution than with the open-loop controller. However, even in
these scenarios, the feedback controller yields solutions closer to socially optimal for
most values of λ. This is not surprising: since all agents are concerned about safety,
they are more able to dynamically adjust to avoid collisions when some feedback about
state is available.
To understand why safety is systematically compromised, consider a single agent’s
incentive. Even though an agent is interested in reaching the goal safely, it does not
account for the fact that being involved in a crash also crashes the other agent. Thus, in
equilibrium safety is compromised relative to social optimum, as agents fail to capture
the externalities associated with crashes.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3: Opposing goal positions without the feedback gain(K = 0).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: Opposing goal positions with the feedback gain(K = 0.5).
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5: Moving in parallel without the feedback gain(K = 0).
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 6: Moving in parallel with the feedback gain(K = 0.5).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7: Intersection without the feedback gain(K = 0, 2 agents).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8: Intersection with the feedback gain(K = 0.5, 2 agents).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9: Intersection without the feedback gain(K = 0, 3 players).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 10: Intersection with the feedback gain(K = 0.5, 3 players).
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